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Article
The Parties to the Nauru Agreement’s Vessel
Day Scheme:
Accounting for the Rare Success of an
International Agreement
Lauren D. Bernadett*
Abstract
International negotiations are notorious for their inability to reach
agreements. If an agreement is reached, there are usually serious
problems with the strength of the deal, defectors, and failure of
implementation. The Vessel Day Scheme between the Parties to the
Nauru Agreement (PNA), eight Pacific Island nations, is a modern
example of a seemingly successful international agreement that
addresses the overexploitation of the Pacific Island tuna fishery. The
Vessel Day Scheme is increasing revenue to its parties through
licensing fees, decreasing catch to ensure the continued existence of
the tuna fishery, and leveraging the PNA to be a stronger
international negotiator than the parties would be individually.
Considering that many international agreements either fall through,
are not ratified by important parties, do not achieve their goals in
practice, do not beneficially affect the target resource because of
loopholes or non-compliance, or suffer from other crippling
problems, the PNA’s experience seems unique. This Article
identifies and analyzes the factors that enable the PNA to experience
success at a time when many other international agreements are
weak, stalled, or are not implemented or enforced in practice.
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THE PARTIES TO THE NAURU AGREEMENT’S
VESSEL DAY SCHEME:
ACCOUNTING FOR THE RARE SUCCESS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
Lauren D. Bernadett
Introduction
The Pacific Islands region is home to one of the largest tuna
fisheries in the world.1 Many people in the Pacific Islands depend on
the tuna fisheries for their subsistence lifestyles and as a source of
revenue, as many Pacific Island nations do not have any other
significant natural resources due to their small landmasses.2 It is
well-known that the world’s tuna fisheries have been overexploited
for decades, leading many to fear the collapse of this valuable
resource. The Pacific Islands tuna fishery is no exception. An
unfortunate conundrum for Pacific Island nations is that while they
depend on the continued existence of the fishery, their tuna-fishing
fleets are not as industrialized or extensive as those of other fishing
nations so, historically, they would not be able to compete with
industrialized fishing nations even if they wanted to do so.3 Left
unaddressed, this implies that a Pacific Island nation’s best option for
raising revenue for itself is to sell permits that would allow distant
water fishing nations to fish in the Pacific Island nation’s waters.
Because the tuna fishery can be accessed from the waters of many
different Pacific Island nations, industrialized fishing countries have
the incentive to see which country would offer the lowest permit
price, essentially bidding down the cost of a fishing permit.
Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what happened in the Pacific Islands
1

Margo Deiye, Making the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) Work, THE U.N. UNIV.,
FISHERIES TRAINING PROGRAMME 6, 10-11 (2007).
2
Id. at 20-21; Robert Gillett, A Short History of Industrial Fishing in the Pacific
Islands, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.
1 (2007), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai001e/ai001e00.pdf.
3
Deiye, supra note 1, at 4.

106

CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L.

Vol. XII

for many years.
In 1982, certain Pacific Island countries signed and ratified
the Nauru Agreement, which declared a broad goal of harmonizing
the fisheries management policies of the signatory nations.4 These
parties became known as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(“PNA”). In 1995, the PNA executed the Palau Agreement, which
originally limited the number of ships that could fish in the PNA’s
waters but was amended in 2007 to adopt instead the Vessel Day
Scheme agreement.5 The Vessel Day Scheme controls tuna landings
in the PNA’s waters by limiting the number of fishing day licenses
that may be sold by each party.6 Under the scheme, licenses must be
sold for at least the designated minimum price to ensure increased
revenue for the PNA.7 The minimum price also prevents distant
water fishing nations from pitting the PNA against each other to see
which country will sell fishing licenses for the lowest price. The
Vessel Day Scheme seems to be a successful international
agreement, as it is reported to be legitimately reaching its goals of
increasing revenue to its parties through licensing fees, decreasing
catch to ensure the continued existence of the tuna fishery, and
leveraging the PNA to be a stronger international negotiator than the
parties would be individually.
Considering that many attempts at international negotiations
do not meet with the same success as the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme,
this Article identifies and analyzes factors that may help explain why
the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme is successful. This Article concludes
that factors may include the small number of parties involved in the
negotiation of the agreement, the similar development and economic
statuses of the parties, the parties’ similar interests and goals to reach
through the agreement, and the fact that these parties have worked
together as a coalition in negotiating an earlier notable tuna treaty.
4

Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of
Common Interest, art. I, Feb. 11, 1982 [hereinafter Nauru Agreement].
5
Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Fishery as
Amended – Management Scheme (Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme), amended
Apr. 27. 2012 [hereinafter Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme].
6
Id. at art. 12.
7
Resolution on Renewed Commitment to Cooperation in Fisheries Management
and Development, PNA Resolution 01-2013, Mar. 1, 2013 [hereinafter Resolution
on Renewed Commitment].
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The conclusions made in this Article are limited, but they offer
insight into the success of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme agreement.
These ideas shed light on how other groups of small, developing
countries can join together to solve collective action problems,
increase their international negotiating power, and protect natural
resources on which they depend.
I.

Background – The Pacific Island Tuna Fisheries and
the Actions of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
A. A Snapshot of the Region and Resources at Stake

The Pacific Islands region is located in the western and
central parts of the Pacific Ocean and consists of twenty-two
countries and territories.8 Because many of these countries and
territories have very small landmasses, most of the area that they
manage is ocean within their Exclusive Economic Zones (“EEZs”).9
EEZs extend 200 nautical miles from each country’s shoreline.10 An
extreme example of this is Kiribati, which has a land-to-sea ratio of
1:5,000.11 The islands are also spread far enough apart that most of
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean falls within the Pacific Island
states’ EEZs.12 Because of this water-based geography, marine
resources are very important to the economies and survival of the
nine million Pacific Island people.13 Many of the Pacific Islands are
considered developing nations.14
The tuna fisheries in this region account for approximately
half of the world’s annual tuna catch.15 Tuna are highly migratory
species and travel longer distances than any other fish, usually
8

Gillett, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
10
Pepe Clarke, Management of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific,
INT’L
UNION
FOR
CONSERVATION
OF
NATURE,
available
at
https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/html/EPLP-072/section11.html#fn1
(last
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.; Gillett, supra note 1, at 1.
14
Clarke, supra note 10.
15
Id.
9
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thousands of miles, to feed and spawn.16 This characteristic makes
them difficult to manage and preserve because it prevents local,
national, or patchwork legal frameworks from imposing improved
management practices over the tuna’s entire range. Once caught,
tuna is a very valuable product and is sold primarily for canning and
sashimi.17 Distant water fishing fleets, hailing from countries such as
the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, catch most of the
tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.18
Tuna has been described as the Pacific Islands’ most valuable
resource.19 Because of the high market value for tuna, careful
management and conservation of Pacific tuna populations is essential
for maximizing economic benefits for Pacific Island people and
development in the region. Small-scale fishing is essential to local
Pacific Island subsistence economies, but industrial-level fishing
may have great potential to support economic development in the
region.20 Industrial tuna fisheries in the Pacific Islands are worth
more than seven times the other Pacific Island fisheries combined.21
Traditionally, the distant water fishing nations realize most of
the benefits from tuna fishing in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean because they catch most of the tuna and host most of the
canning facilities.22 However, in recent years, some of the Pacific
Island states have joined together to recapture the value of tuna from
within and outside of their EEZs by expanding their processing
industry, creating and expanding domestic industrial fishing fleets,
and jointly managing tuna stocks. This Article focuses on agreements
16

Biological Characteristics of Tuna, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N.: FISHERIES &
AQUACULTURE DEP’T, available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16082/en (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
17
Tuna Resources, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N.: FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T,
available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/12251/en (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
18
Clarke, supra note 10.
19
Id.
20
Id. “Industrial fishing” is generally understood to mean offshore fishing in large
vessels. Gillett, supra note 2, at 2.
21
Gillett, supra note 2, at 2.
22
Clarke, supra note 10 (“Historically, about 90 per cent of the total tuna catch in
the Western and Central Pacific has been harvested by four distant-water fishing
nations: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the United States of America.”); see also
Gillett, supra note 2, at 10 (noting failed Pacific Island canneries and “stiff
competition from efficient Asian facilities”).
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created by Pacific Island countries to manage and protect tuna stocks
that are fished within and between the countries’ EEZs.
B. The Beginning – The Forum Fisheries Agency and the
Nauru Agreement
During the process to sign and ratify the Third United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the
international treaty that established EEZs, seventeen Pacific Island
states executed the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
Convention (“SPFFAC”), which entered into force on August 9,
1979.23 The SPFFAC established the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries
Agency (“FFA”) to help Pacific Island states sustainably manage the
fishery resources in their EEZs to improve economic and social wellbeing.24 The FFA is a central source of expertise, technology, and
information gathering and disseminating for the member states.25 It
focuses mainly on economic and legal issues rather than scientific or
biological issues.26 Unlike other international fisheries management
organizations, the FFA was created specifically for the benefit of the
Pacific Island states and excluded distant water fishing nations.27
Amidst the hype of UNCLOS, the SPFFAC created a unified voice
among the Pacific Island states that sent a strong message that these
states intended to “enforce their sovereign rights over the marine

23

South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, July 10, 1979; FFA
Members,
PAC.
ISLANDS
F.
FISHERIES
AGENCY,
available
at
http://www.ffa.int/members (last visited Apr. 14, 2014); Regional Fishery Bodies
Summary Descriptions: Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.
U.N.: FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/ffa/en
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
24
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, supra note 23, at art. I; Lisa
K. Bostwick, Empowering South Pacific Fishmongers: A New Framework for
Preferential Access Agreements in the South Pacific Tuna Industry, 26 L. & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 897, 901 (1995).
25
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, supra note 23, at art. VII.
26
Bostwick, supra note 24, at 901.
27
Id. Rising tensions at UNCLOS due to the United States’ refusal to recognize
Pacific Island states’ jurisdiction over tuna was a factor in the formation of the
FFA as a group exclusive to the Pacific Islands. Id.
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resources, i.e. tuna, in their respective EEZs.”28
Certain parties to the SPFFAC—the Federated States of
Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, and the Solomon Islands—went further to ensure economic
benefits to their countries through their sovereign management rights
over their EEZs. In 1982, they executed the Nauru Agreement
Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common
Interest (“Nauru Agreement”).29 The Nauru Agreement declared a
broad and vague goal of harmonizing the management of fisheries in
the parties’ EEZs without specific implementation measures.30 The
Nauru Agreement required the parties to eventually create a licensing
and fee scheme for foreign vessels seeking to fish in the parties’
EEZs.31 These parties, which now include Tuvalu, are known as the
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (“PNA”).
C. Implementation – the Palau Agreement and the Vessel
Day Scheme
Even though the PNA includes only eight of the Pacific
Island states, their EEZs encompass a significant tuna fishery that
covers 14.8 million square kilometers.32 According to the PNA,
twenty-five percent of the world’s tuna stocks and fifty percent of
the global stock of skipjack live in PNA waters.33
Maximizing the flow of economic benefits from the tuna
fisheries to the PNA states and their citizens continues to be a
concern for the PNA.34 This is especially crucial for the PNA states,
28

Kathleen M. Burch, Due Process in Micronesia: Are Fish Due Less Process?, 8
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 43, 53 (2002).
29
Nauru Agreement, supra note 4. Tuvalu is also now a party to this agreement.
See Pacifical, PACIFICAL, http://pacifical.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2014).
30
Id. at art I.
31
Id. at art. II.
32
The 8 PNA Countries = 25% of the World Tuna Catch, PACIFICAL,
http://pacifical.com/the_pna_countries.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
33
Id.;
About
Us,
PARTIES
TO
THE
NAURU
AGREEMENT,
http://www.pnatuna.com/About-Us (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). Skipjack is the
most commonly canned tuna. About Us, supra.
34
The Pacifical People, PACIFICAL, http://pacifical.com/people.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2014).
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which are still considered developing countries and estimate that
only eleven percent of the profits from tuna caught in PNA waters
return to the people of the PNA.35
To better manage their valuable fisheries and implement the
goals of the Nauru Agreement, the PNA needed an agreement with
specific implementation measures. The Palau Agreement for the
Management of the Western Pacific Fishery (“Palau Agreement”),36
adopted in 1995, originally limited the number of purse seine vessels
that were allowed to fish in PNA EEZs.37 Purse seine vessels are
commercial fishing ships that encircle entire schools of fish, enabling
consistent, efficient, and large catches.38 Because of the large impact
of purse seine vessels, limiting their numbers would in theory help
protect the tuna fisheries from overfishing. The original Palau
Agreement management scheme was replaced in December 2007 by
the Vessel Day Scheme, an amendment to the Palau Agreement.39
The Vessel Day Scheme caps the total number of days of purse seine
fishing in the parties’ combined EEZs and allocates fishing day
licenses to parties based on historical catches.40 The parties may then
sell the licenses to foreign fishing fleets or other PNA countries and
allocate the necessary number of licenses to domestic fisheries.41 The
broad goals of the Vessel Day Scheme are to (1) maximize the
PNA’s rate of return from tuna fishing in their waters and (2) reduce
tuna catches to sustainable levels.42
Setting up a licensing and fee scheme for any vessel fishing
in PNA waters ensured that at least some money would flow back to
the PNA from foreign fishing fleets that wanted to fish in the PNA’s
tuna-rich EEZs. However, without a minimum fee, foreign fleets
could pit the PNA against each other to determine which country

35

Id.
Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5.
37
Id. at art. 1; Deiye, supra note 1, at 13.
38
Purse Seine, INT’L SEAFOOD SUSTAINABILITY FOUND., http://issfoundation.org/purse-seine/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
39
Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5.
40
Id. at art. 12; Deiye, supra note 28, at 5, 13.
41
Deiye, supra note 28, at 22.
42
Id. at 13; Vessel Day Scheme: Introduction, PAC. ISLANDS F. FISHERIES AGENCY,
http://www.ffa.int/vds (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
36
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would offer the lowest fee to fish in its EEZ.43 This disadvantaged
the PNA because they were forced to either accept low offers from
foreign fleets in exchange for access to their high value marine
resources or risk receiving no revenue. The revenue that the PNA
countries received for access to their EEZs was lower than if they
gathered collectively to set a baseline minimum fee to leverage
themselves against the foreign fleets.
In 2011, the parties set a minimum price for fishing day
licenses sold under their Vessel Day Scheme.44 This move altered the
power dynamic between the PNA and distant water fishing nations
by preventing foreign fleets from pitting the PNA against each other
to see which country would offer the lowest license price in
exchange for the foreign fleet’s business. Currently, license fees cost
$6,000 for one vessel for one day of purse seine fishing.45 Vessels
under fifty meters long count for a half day of fishing, a fifty to
eighty meter vessel counts for a full day, and any vessel over eighty
meters counts for one and a half fishing days.46 The Vessel Day
Scheme has characteristics similar to a cap and trade scheme, as the
total allowable fishing days are capped, the days are distributed to
the parties, and PNA countries can transfer their fishing days to other
PNA participants.
The Vessel Day Scheme differs from other fisheries
management schemes in that the licenses limit the number of fishing
days rather than set catch limits. To ensure that licensees do not
increase their daily catch ability over time, the PNA are briefed at
their annual meetings on “observed or potential increase in average
effective fishing effort for each fishing day[,]” called “effort creep”
in the agreement.47 The Palau Agreement requires that the parties
43

This problem was recognized in a 2013 Memorandum of Understanding between
PNA members. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Parties to the Palau
Agreement on Minimum Bench Mark Fee for a Fishing Day Under the Vessel Day
Scheme, Mar. 1, 2013 [hereinafter Bench Mark Fee Memorandum] (“…[T]he
Parties are desirous of establishing a minimum bench mark fee for a fishing day
under the Vessel Day Scheme for foreign fishing fleets to avoid these fleets
undermining the Parties efforts by playing them off against each other.”).
44
Resolution on Renewed Commitment, supra note 7.
45
Id.; Bench Mark Fee Memorandum, supra note 43.
46
Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5, at art. 6.1iv-vi.
47
Id. at art. 2.4(ii).
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take any measure necessary “to ensure such effort creep is not
detrimental to the fishery.”48 Although it may seem odd that an
agreement that aims to reduce catch measures effort in units of
fishing days rather than catch, it is likely easier to measure and
enforce fishing days.
The Palau Agreement’s Implementing Arrangements
establish minimum terms and conditions for fishing in waters
controlled by the PNA. They require fishing vessels licensed under
the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme to have an Automatic Location
Communicator in order to monitor the vessel’s location, speed, and
course.49 The most recent arrangement introduced catch retention
measures to prevent lower value tuna from being excessively
dumped overboard.50 It also banned purse seine fishing vessels from
using fish aggregating devices (“FADs”) between July 1 and
September 30.51 FADs can problematic for fisheries management
because they increase catch.52 The most recent arrangement also
prohibits PNA-licensed fishing vessels from fishing in international
waters between PNA EEZs and within certain coordinates.53 This
unique development, discussed in-depth in Part I.D., gives the PNA
some control over international waters, or the “high seas,” even
though the PNA does not have jurisdiction over those waters.
D. Reaching Beyond National Management Boundaries
– Regulating the High Seas
The PNA crafted a unique development to attempt to mitigate
48

Id.
A Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth
Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties,
art. II, Sept. 19, 1990.
50
A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth
Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties,
art. I(1), May 16, 2008 (amended Sept. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Third Implementing
Arrangement].
51
Id. at art. I(2).
52
See Fish Aggregating Device, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N.: FISHERIES &
AQUACULTURE, http://www.fao.org/fishery/equipment/fad/en (last visited Apr. 14,
2014).
53
Third Implementing Arrangement, supra note 50, at art. I(3).
49
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the problem of the migratory character of tuna and the lack of
jurisdiction on the high seas. Because tuna are highly migratory and
move between many different boundaries, the PNA were concerned
that their efforts to foster a steady tuna population by limiting catch
days in their EEZs would be undermined by unregulated fishing on
the high seas.54 In 2007, the PNA brought their concerns to the
Western and Central Pacific Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
Commission (“WCPFC”), a regional fisheries management
organization that includes distant water fishing states like the United
States and Japan.55 Unfortunately, the WCPFC could not make a
decision on how to regulate fishing on the high seas.56
The PNA decided to act on its own. As a condition of the
PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme license, PNA-licensed ships were not
allowed to fish in the high seas pockets between the PNA EEZs.57
Thus, a ship could either be licensed by the PNA to fish in an EEZ
and agree to not fish the high seas, or not seek a license and be
allowed to fish in the high seas but not any EEZs. This latter choice
is economically difficult because “the majority of the main purseseine fishing grounds in the Western and Central Pacific” are located
in an EEZ that belongs to the PNA.58 This collective action by the
PNA influenced action by the WCPFC, and the next year, the
WCPFC adopted a compatible measure.59
E. Going Forward – Relying on Collective Action
The Vessel Day Scheme relies on compliance by all parties
with regards to the price set for licenses and the number of licenses
sold. If some Vessel Day Scheme licenses were not sold due to low
demand, parties would have an incentive to defect from the
agreement by offering their licenses for a lower price. If one party
was to break the scheme and offer fishing day licenses at a lower
54

Tim Adams, Pacific Island Tuna Fisheries: New Bold Steps, 58 TUNA FISHERIES
22, 23 (2011).
55
Id. at 24.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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price, foreign fishing fleets would presumably gravitate towards
buying licenses from that party. This would decrease revenue
brought to other PNA countries through the Vessel Day Scheme
while increasing revenue for the one defector party.
Similarly, if all the available licenses were sold, parties
would have an incentive to sell more licenses than they have been
allocated under the Vessel Day Scheme. Selling more than the
allocated number of licenses would fulfill one of the PNA’s goals, to
increase parties’ economic gain from their fisheries, but would
undermine the PNA’s goal of ensuring the tuna’s continued existence
so that it can continue to be a source of profit in the future. A small
number of licenses sold beyond the cap would likely not destroy the
entire fishery. However, defectors can start the trend that makes the
agreements irrelevant by undermining the scheme’s legitimacy and
the protective purpose of the agreements.
The Vessel Day Scheme has already experienced one
defector. One party “significantly exceeded its Party Allowable
Effort (PAE),” or the number of licenses that was allocated to that
party.60 The other parties agreed to not penalize that party “on the
basis of that Party’s assurance that the [Vessel Day Scheme] will be
fully implemented in 2013 and beyond.”61 The details of this defect
are unclear. However, it is clear that the PNA took measures to reign
in the defector and intend to continue with their collective agreement
despite the occurrence of a defector.
II.

Factors Contributing to the Success of the Parties to
the Nauru Agreement’s Vessel Day Scheme
Agreement

The development and implementation of the PNA’s Vessel
Day Scheme should be considered successful. The parties created an
agreement that was ratified by all parties and is in effect for all
parties even though the agreement puts real constraints on all parties.
Parties’ revenues from fishing license fees have increased
significantly and are continuing to increase due to their ability to
60
61

Resolution on Renewed Commitment, supra note 7.
Id.
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agree to raise the minimum licensing fee.62 Parties are also achieving
real progress in tuna conservation (at least within and between their
own EEZs – this claim is complicated because of tuna’s expansive
migration patterns), as fishing in a significant part of the fishable
areas of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean has decreased to a
level that, for now, the parties believe is sustainable. Considering
that many international agreements fall through, are not ratified by
important parties, do not achieve their goals in practice, do not
beneficially affect the target resource because of loopholes or noncompliance, or suffer from other crippling problems, the PNA’s
experience seems unique.
Surely, there are domestic characteristics that likely affected
parties’ abilities to quickly and effectively construct and implement
the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme. This Article does not address those
factors. It instead focuses on international characteristics that led to
the success of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme.
Factors that likely contribute to the success of the PNA’s
Vessel Day Scheme agreement include the small number of parties
that are involved in the negotiations, the similarities in the parties’
development and economic statuses, the like-mindedness of parties
in terms of their interests and goals for the agreement, and the fact
that these parties have worked as a coalition before in negotiating a
tuna treaty with the United States. None of these factors alone could
ensure the success of the Vessel Day Scheme. Rather, it is the
combination of these factors, and likely other factors not identified
here, that caused the PNA’s success.
A. Small Number of Parties Involved
Only eight parties were involved in the negotiations and
outcomes of the Vessel Day Scheme agreement.63 Involving only a
small number of participants simplifies the negotiation process as,
theoretically, each party has a greater chance to voice concerns, have
those concerns addressed by other parties, and participate equally in
the negotiations.
62

Deiye, supra note 1, at 2 (Figure 2).
See Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5, at Schedule 1 (listing the
parties to the agreement); Pacifical, supra note 29.

63
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Of course, even bilateral international negotiations sometimes
do not come to fruition, despite the low number of parties. Thus,
while the small number of parties was likely helpful in successfully
ratifying and implementing the agreement, other factors necessarily
contributed as well.
B. Parties With Similar Development and Economic
Statuses
The PNA are similarly situated in their development status
and relationship with the global market. As already mentioned, all
the parties to the Nauru agreement are considered developing
countries, and some are even listed as “Least Developed Countries”
by the United Nations.64 None of them acting on their own are major
international actors or have significant political sway. They are also
similar in that they have small populations relative to other countries.
All the PNA countries are influenced by their “small domestic
market, remoteness from major markets, limited resource base, lack
of a skilled and trained workforce, a narrow export base, heavy
reliance on imports, poorly developed infrastructure and
vulnerability to natural disasters.”65
These similarities are important because they allow the
parties to create an agreement with provisions that affect all involved
countries equally. This prevents any one country from feeling
disproportionately burdened by the action or funding required under
the agreement.
Compare this to negotiations between countries that differ
greatly in their development status, place in the global market,
population, and wealth. For example, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change’s (“UNFCCC”) Kyoto Protocol
included countries along the entire development spectrum. The
Kyoto Protocol separated parties into Annex I parties, which
included industrialized countries as identified under the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development and economies in
64
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transition, and non-Annex I parties, which were considered
developing countries, including countries with high greenhouse gas
emissions, such as China and India.66 Only Annex I countries were
assigned quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives.
This created problems as some Annex I countries protested carrying
the burden of emissions reductions while high-emission, non-Annex
I countries like China and India continued to increase their
greenhouse gas emissions. This example is limited, as the UNFCCC
negotiations include almost every country in the world. A negotiation
with this many parties, even if they were all of similar status and
market profile, would likely be difficult as well.
Another example stems from regional fisheries management
organizations, which have fewer members than the UNFCCC, in
particular the Western and Central Pacific Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks Commission (“WCPFC”), discussed earlier. The WCPFC
includes Pacific Island countries, including all of the PNA, and
distant water fishing nations such as the United States, China, the
European Union, and Japan, totaling twenty-five members.67 The
WCPFC requires consensus in its decision-making, and when the
PNA brought their concerns about fishing on the high seas to the
WCPFC, the diverse group of countries could not agree on high seas
fishing regulations.68 The parties were likely unable to reach
consensus because of a split between parties with diverging fishing
capacities and profit incentives. This is another example of the
difficulty in reaching agreement because of status, market, and other
economic differences between involved parties, even when the
negotiating group includes a small number of parties relative to the
UNFCCC.
Successfully creating and implementing an agreement that
requires action, such as some sort of reduction or restriction, will be
difficult when it involves parties with varying development and
66
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economic statuses and thus capacity to act. The countries that believe
themselves to be carrying a disproportionate burden have incentive
to object. Negotiating with countries of similar development and
economic status will place a similar burden on all countries, thereby
reducing the likelihood of “disproportionate burden” objections by
one party.
C. Similar Interests and Goals for Negotiations
Negotiating with like-minded entities is easier than
negotiating with entities that fundamentally disagree as to the
problem (or whether there is a problem) and the goals of the
negotiation.69 Because of the PNA’s similar statuses, discussed
above, and similar dependence on their marine resources, particularly
tuna, for subsistence use as well as economic gain, all eight parties
entered into negotiations and agreements with similar management
goals. These management goals were likely simplified due to the
similarities in the parties’ geography, resources at stake, and interest
in maximizing revenue from and continued existence of the resource
at stake.
Fishing license fees are a primary source of revenue for the
PNA, and most of the PNA states are highly dependent on the
revenue from the licensing fees.70 In most PNA countries, between
twenty and fifty percent of each country’s GDP comes from
licensing fees.71 Papua New Guinea is the least dependent on
licensing fees (two percent GDP in 2000) because it is rich in nonmarine resources and has a significant mining and agricultural sector
compared to the other PNA countries.72 Palau is also less dependent
on fishing fees because of its significant tourism industry, but fishing
fees still represent anywhere between four and thirty-four percent of
the GDP for each of Palau’s sixteen states.73
Most of the people of the PNA rely on the health of the
fisheries around their islands for their subsistence lifestyle and
69
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cannot afford for the fisheries to collapse. Thus, ensuring the
continued existence of a healthy fishery around the islands is not just
crucial for the revenue it brings to the PNA, but also for the food that
PNA citizens rely on for survival. Many PNA countries do not have
a significant agricultural sector other than subsistence fishing, and
therefore must import much of their food.
Additionally, the group’s expansive joint EEZs, cohesive
voice, and management scheme give the PNA more negotiating
power than the parties had individually. Generally, bilateral
agreements between individual Pacific Island states and distant water
fishing nations dilutes the negotiating strength of the Pacific Island
region as a whole.74 The frustration of being mostly powerless,
small, poor countries was part of the impetus to form the Southern
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency when the United States refused to
recognize the Pacific Islands’ jurisdiction over tuna in the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.75 The spillover effect of
the Vessel Day Scheme in breaking the WCPFC stalemate over the
management of fishing on the high seas reinforces how powerful
small, developing countries can be when they organize and reach
enforceable management agreements.
The degradation of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
tuna fishery is a major threat to the way of life for the parties. A
legitimate management scheme not only protects the continued
existence of the fisheries, but also increases the PNA’s power in
international negotiations. Thus, the similar goals made the parties’
decision to enter negotiations relatively easier.
D. Previous Cooperation for Other Agreements
The PNA’s success with the Vessel Day Management
Scheme has also been attributed to the Pacific Islands’ cooperation as
a coalition in negotiating the Treaty on Fisheries Between the
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of
the United States of America (“U.S. Treaty”) in 1987 and the
renewals in 1993 and 2003.76 Until the U.S. Treaty, “the United
74
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States refused to acknowledge [n]either the island nations’ ownership
claims over tuna found within their EEZs [n]or their right to charge
access fees to fish for tuna caught within their EEZs.”77 The U.S.
Treaty negotiations began after the United States instated embargoes
in retaliation against Papua New Guinea for seizing a United States
vessel that was fishing illegally.78 To solve the problem, the United
States and sixteen Pacific Island states negotiated the U.S. Treaty,
which secures licensing fees and fisheries-related technical
assistance packages for the Pacific Island states.79 The Treaty is
considered a successful treaty for the Pacific Island states and a
model for other international agreements.80 Indeed, it is considered a
major reason and model for the PNA’s success in working together
as a coalition to create the Vessel Day Scheme.81
Conclusion
The PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme serves as a rare example of a
successful international agreement. The parties continue to realize
increased power in international negotiations and revenue growth
from their valuable marine resources. They are implementing a
management system to ensure the longevity and health of their tuna
stocks to serve subsistence and economic purposes. The small
number of parties involved, the parties’ socio-economic similarities,
the convergence of interests and united goals of the agreement, and
the fact that these parties have previously worked as a coalition in
negotiating the U.S. Treaty are all factors that contribute to the
success of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme agreement.
Additional primary sources are necessary to (1) conclude that
these factors indeed contributed to the original and continuing
success of the Vessel Day Scheme, (2) incorporate additional factors
that played a role in the Scheme’s success, and (3) address the other
questions posed in this Article. However, the conclusions drawn in
77

Bostwick, supra note 24, at 911.
Id.
79
Id.; US Multilateral Treaty, PAC. ISLANDS F. FISHERIES AGENCY,
http://www.ffa.int/taxonomy/term/441 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
80
Bostwick, supra note 24, at 912.
81
Deiye, supra note 1, at 16.
78

122

CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L.

Vol. XII

this Article are relevant starting points to further exploring these
inquiries that may shed light on how other groups of small,
developing countries can join together to solve collective action
problems, increase their international negotiating power, and protect
natural resources on which they depend.

